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JEFFm ROSEN*
In the remarkable race cases of 1995, four Justices-Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia, William Rehnquist, and Anthony Kenne-
dy-committed themselves to the principle that government can
almost never classify citizens on the basis of race. They paved the way
for the judicial invalidation of most forms of affirmative action by
insisting that all racial preferences are presumptively unconstitutional
unless narrowly designed as a remedy for past discrimination. They
signaled their readiness to declare the Voting Rights Act unconstitu-
tional by declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states
from using race as the "predominant purpose" in drawing electoral
districts.' They made clear their impatience with court-ordered
desegregation plans, the most tangible legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education.2 The ideal of a color-blind Constitution is close to
securing five votes on the Supreme Court for the first time since it
was considered and rejected during Reconstruction.
In cases where they found it politically convenient, the conservative
Justices were obsessively attentive to constitutional history. They
exalted the understanding of the Anti-Federalists over the Federalists,
of Lincoln over Calhoun. But in the race cases, there is a conspicuous
silence. Discussions of the original meaning of the Reconstruction
amendments-from which the conservatives claim to derive the
principle that the Constitution is color-blind-are nowhere to be
found. And no wonder. An examination of the historical evidence
suggests that the original intentions of the radical Republicans in 1865
are flamboyantly inconsistent with the color-blindjurisprudence of the
conservative Justices in 1995. In this Essay, I will very briefly and
broadly sketch the outlines of an originalist approach to the Four-
* Legal affairs editor, The New Repubfia This Essay is based on a talk delivered at the
Washington College of Law.
1. Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1995) (holding that Georgia's congressional
redistricting plan violates Equal Protection Clause).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and will suggest that if the
conservative justices were coherent originalists, they would have voted
for judicial restraint rather than judicial activism in the race cases of
1995.
As liberal and conservative legal historians of Reconstruction have
argued, the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to forbid all
racial discrimination in all circumstances, but instead to guarantee to
all citizens a limited set of absolute civil rights.' These rights were
unclear at the margins, but not in broad relief. They were widely
understood to include the common law rights guaranteed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,' such as the right to make and enforce con-
tracts,' the right to sue and be sued,' and the right to inherit
property,7 as well as (and this is more controversial) the rights
guaranteed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.8 They
were crisply distinguished, however, in the nineteenth century
locution, from two other sets of rights-political rights and social
rights. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment said repeatedly
that the Amendment was intended to protect civil rights, but not
political or social rights.
The Reconstruction distinction between political rights and social
rights suggests that a principle of color-blindness, if derived from the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, would be far
narrower than modem conservatives like to suggest. Consider the
relevant passage from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,9
which modem conservatives like to quote selectively:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth,
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time,
if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution,
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, domi-
nant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
3. Compare EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 1863-1869
(1990) with Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193
(1992).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981-
2000h-6 (1994)).
5. Id
6. I&
7. Id.
8. See Amar, supra note 3, at 1196 (discussing Justice Black's view that Fourteenth
Amendment made first eight amendments applicable to states).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or
of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law
of the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this
high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the
land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to
regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon
the basis of race.1"
Harlan's complicated dissent is subject to many readings, but a per
se rule against intentional discrimination in all circumstances is not
one of them. The simultaneous ode to the civil equality and social
inferiority of the freedmen was representative of the views of other
moderate Republicans, including President Lincoln, who struck a
similar note in the 1858 presidential debates.' Notably, Justice
Harlan's careful insistence that "in respect of civil rights all citizens
are equal before the law" 2 is hard to reconcile with a broad guaran-
tee of political or social equality. Voting was not regarded as a funda-
mental right of citizenship in an era in which women were considered
citizens invested with basic civil rights, such as the right to make
contracts, but were denied the right to vote.'3 To the extent that
Justice Harlan is arguing for a color-blind constitution, it is in respect
to civil rights alone, which were understood far more narrowly in the
nineteenth century than they are today.
IfJustice Harlan's vision of limited absolute equality with respect to
civil rights is narrower than the broad color-blind position of the
modem conservatives, it is more expansive than the racially asymmet-
rical position of some modem liberals. In a provocative reinterpreta-
tion ofJustice Harlan's dissent, Professor Alexander Aleinikoff of the
University of Michigan argues that Harlan was not attacking the use
of racial classifications, but a social system based on white suprema-
cy-.4 According to Akleinikoffs reading of Justice Harlan, what was
offensive about the law requiring segregated railway cars in Plessy v.
10. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (HarlanJ., dissenting).
11. CREATED EQUAL: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858 117 (Paul M.
Angle ed., 1958) (chronicling debates over slavery occasioned by Dred Scott decision).
12. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
13. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work. The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 103YAE LJ. 1073,1084 (1994) (discussingarguments of various women's rights
activists during suffrage movement of late 19th century that women with basic civil rights should
have right to vote).
14. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson: Freedom, Anti-racism, and Citisenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961 (arguing that Justice
Harlan's dissent "neither purported to be an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause...
nor [an argument] for color-blindness as that term is understood today").
1996]
THE AMERICAN UNVERSTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:791
Ferguson was not that it classified citizens on the basis of race, but that
its purpose and effect were to "maintain a race-based caste system in
which whites subjugated blacks."15 As Aleinkioff interprets Justice
Harlan's dissent, the dissent argued that the Civil War Amendments
protected the rights of citizens from unreasonable burdens; that the
state must identify a legitimate purpose whenever it regulated those
rights; and that white supremacy was an impermissible pur-
pose-("There is no caste here.")'" The Louisiana statute at issue
in Plessy, therefore, was an unconstitutional regulation of "the
personal freedom of citizens. "17
A less historically sophisticated version of the anti-caste principle
appears in Regents of University of California v. Bakke." Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to prohibit racial classifications in all
circumstances, but only when the classifications promote racial
castes.19 The Justices argued that "[g] overnment may take race into
account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to
remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice."2
In other words, the Constitution forbids racial classifications only
when they "stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption
that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of
government behind racial hatred and separatism."21  Virtually all
racial preferences designed to help blacks are permissible, according
to this view, because they are not based on stigmatizing prejudice for
whites, but instead on a desire to remedy the effects of discrimination
in society as a whole.
As historical support for the anti-caste position, Justice Thurgood
Marshall relied on a brief by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund,22 later published by Eric Schnapper in the Virginia Law
Review.2" Schnapper argued that the same Congress that passed the
Reconstruction amendments "adopted a series of social welfare
15. Id. at 969.
16. i& at 970.
17. Id
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978).
20. I. at 325.
21. Id. at 357-58.
22. Id. at 398 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985) (discussing affirmative action programs passed by
Congress at time of Fourteenth Amendment that were "open to all blacks, not only to recently
freed slaves, and were adopted over repeatedly expressed opinions that such racially exclusive
measures were unfair to whites").
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programs whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks. These
programs were generally open to all blacks, not only to recently freed
slaves, and were adopted over repeatedly expressed objections that
racially exclusive measures were unfair to whites."24
Although provocative, Schnapper's brief is a work of advocacy, and
it has been convincingly rebutted. As Professors Herman Belz25 and
Paul Moreno26 have argued, concerns about favoritism for blacks,
and a commitment to the principle of no "discrimination based on
color,"27 persuaded the Reconstruction Congress to extend the
protections of the Freedmen's Bureau on a color-blind basis,
protecting white refugees who had been driven from their land as well
as black freedmen. Beginning with the Freedmen's Bureau Act of
1865,28 subsequent freedmen's acts referred to "refugees and
freedmen," because a majority of Republicans believed that continu-
ing to use race, "even for the purpose of preventing discrimination,
was inconsistent with equality before the law."29
In debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans
frequently emphasized that they believed all persons, white as well as
black, should have the same civil rights, rejecting any notion that the
Amendment was intended to protect racial minorities alone.30 Many
supporters recalled Southern efforts to suppress abolitionist literature
during the 1830s and 1840s.11 Their paradigmatic case involved the
24. Id. at 754.
25. See HERMAN BELz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S
RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at vii (1976) (reviewing patterns of race relations and civil rights in
United States and their assumption of "essentially modem form during civil war and
reconstruction").
26. See Paul Moreno, Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legislation, 61 J. OF S. HISTORY
271, 271-72 (1995) (discussing tension between scholars who argue that Reconstruction
amendments were meant to be color-blind and those who believe amendments envisioned
"benign" racial classifications for purpose of achieving equality of citizenship).
27. See id. at 273.
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 508 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1983 (1994)).
29. BELZ, supra note 25, at 149-50.
30. SeeBERNARD ScHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CVIL RIGHTS 196
(1970) (quoting Rep. William Higby as stating that "laws must be made equal; that they must
be administered equally upon all classes, without regard to color or race"); Steven A. Bank, Anti-
miscegenation Laws and the Law of Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 303 (1995) (discussing Republican use of "law of
symmetry" during Reconstruction Amendment debates to justify color-blind Civil Rights
proposals); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small
Chea for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics, 88 MICH. L REv. 1366, 1369 (1990) (reviewing
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLTIcAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1988) ("Republican proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment all agree that race
was not a legitimate reason to treat people differently with respect to their civil rights.")).
31. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press,
and Petition in 1835-1837, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785, 798 (1995) (discussing southern states' laws
criminalizing teaching slaves to read as effort to "vaccinate" blacks against "infection by enforced
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indignities suffered by a white dignitary, Samuel Hoar, who had been
dispatched as an emissary from Massachusetts to challenge the black
seamen laws which forbade free black sailors from the North from
disembarking in southern ports, for fear they would lead slave
revolts. 2 Hoar's constitutional theory was that the free blacks were
citizens of Massachusetts, and that the black seamen laws violated
their privileges and immunities of state citizenship 3 under Article
IV, Section 2, the Comity Clause. 4 His visit to Charleston, however,
stirred up wild antipathy among the proud Southerners: local
authorities refused to protect him from threats of violence, and after
the state legislature called for his expulsion, he left without prosecut-
ing his suit.-3 The expulsion of Hoar became a cause celebre in the
North, and during debates over the Fourteenth Amendment,
Republicans repeatedly invoked the Hoar incident as an example of
why it was necessary to give Congress and the courts the power to
enforce the privileges and immunities of citizenship for all citizens,
white as well as black. It is hard, therefore, to argue that the
amendment was aimed exclusively at intentional racial discrimination
against blacks.
Even painting with a very broad brush, I think it is fair to say that
the stark positions of modern conservative and liberalJustices-radical
color-blindness on the one hand and an asymmetrical caste principle
on the other-are hard to reconcile with the historical understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where does that leave ajustice who
literacy"); Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and "the Constitutional Right to
BearArms": Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. Lj. 341,343
(1995) (comparing references in congressional debates that were race-neutral to references
specifically seeking to protect or establish civil rights of blacks); KurtT. Lash, The Second Adoption
of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
1106, 1134 (1994) (discussing 1830s outlawing of abolitionists' literature in response to Nat
Turner's uprising of 1831 in which 70 whites were killed).
32. See Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom ... ": The Right to Travel and
Exraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 938 (1993) (discussing effect of Samuel Hoar's
experiences on Fourteenth Amendment debates).
33. See HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERIcA 578-
82 (1872). Upon returning from an unsuccessful trip to South Carolina to procure right of free
black Massachusetts sailors to disembark at Charleston, Hoar remarked in a report to Congress:
"Has the U.S. Constitution the least practical validity in South Carolina? South Carolina claims
she trumps the Massachusetts courts which find these [black] men free." Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.").
35. SeePaul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intention of the Framers: The Limits of Historical
Analysis, 50 U. Prr. L. REv. 349, 389 (1989) (noting that Hoar spent only single night in
Charleston before "officials told him they could not guarantee his safety .... [T]he South
Carolina legislature... asked the governor to expel him from the state, declaring that Hoar was
an 'emissary sent... with avowed purpose of interfering with South Carolina's institutions and
disturbing her peace'" (quoting South Carolina Resolution to Dec. 5, 1844, reprinted in STATE
DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 238 (H. Ames ed., 1970)).
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wants to examine the historical evidence scrupulously, and apply it to
modem controversies about affirmative action and voting rights?
The voting rights question, I think, is the easier of the two. If there
was one principle that most of the members of the Reconstruction
Congress agreed on, it was that the Fourteenth Amendment was
limited to civil rights; it did not include political rights, and therefore
did not impose a color-blind rule on the suffrage. When Senator
Jacob Howard of Michigan introduced the Amendment in the Senate
on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, he pointed to
the corresponding language in Article IV to explain why it was
obvious to everyone that the privileges or immunities of citizens could
not include voting. Clearly a tourist from Massachusetts could not
arrive in South Carolina and expect to vote in South Carolina
elections. Moreover, the Committee Report accompanying the
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly stated that it would not affect state
authority over voting rights."
A specific originalist like Justice Clarence Thomas, therefore,
should presumably reach the same conclusion as Justice John M.
Harlan, who reviewed the historical evidence exhaustively in Reynolds
v. Sims, 7 and reached the following conclusion:
I think it demonstrable that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
impose this political tenet [of one man one vote] on the States or
authorize this Court to do so .... State legislative apportionments,
as such, are wholly free of constitutional limitations, save as may be
imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause ......
What about the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbids the state and
federal government from denying or abridging the right to vote on
the basis of race?39 Once again, it provides little comfort for a
specific originalist. There were a range of positions during the
Fifteenth Amendment debates. Radical Republicans wanted to
guarantee universal suffrage, outlawing all literacy tests, poll taxes,
36. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2755 (1866). The report stated:
The committee were of the opinion that the states are not yet prepared to sanction so
fundamental a change as would be the concession of the right to suffrage to the
colored race. We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no
misunderstanding on the subject. It was our opinion that three-fourths of the states of
this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any
degree or under any restriction, to the colored race.
IdL
37. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
38. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-91 (1964).
39. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV § 1.
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and discriminatory qualifications for holding public office.4" Both
the House4 and Senate,42 at different times, passed versions of an
amendment proposed by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts,
which provided that "[n] o discrimination shall be made in any State
among the citizens of the United States in the exercise of the elective
franchise or in the right to hold office in any State on account of
race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious creed."4
The Universal Suffrage amendment, however, was eventually
rejected by the conference committee, because there was no majority
in the Fortieth Congress to abolish literacy tests, property require-
ments, and the like. Instead, the language eventually adopted was
based on the idea of impartial and qualified, rather than universal
and unqualified, suffrage. The drafters not only intended to leave
untouched voting qualifications that had a discriminatory impact, such
as literacy tests, they also intended not to disturb qualifications that
were explicitly designed to disenfranchise blacks." The only new
requirement of the Amendment, which looks nothing like a broad
prohibition of race-conscious districting, was that any qualification for
voting had to apply equally, in theory, to all races. This is hardly
enough to sustain Justice Kennedy's theory that race may not be used
as the "predominant purpose in districting."4
The affirmative action question is much more complicated. How
should a principled originalist come out in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena?4 6 Under the Reconstruction conception of limited absolute
equality, government has to extend to all citizens the same civil rights
40. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Sefice as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 203, 259 (1995) (discussing early drafts of Fifteenth Amendment proscribing poll taxes
and literacy tests which southern states had used to dilute effect of race-neutral voting
provisions).
41. The Senate passed the amendment 31-27, with 8 absentees on Feb. 9, 1869. S. Res. 186,
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1040 (1869).
42. John Bingham proposed a similar amendment in the House on Feb. 20, 1869. Senate
Resolution 8 passed 92-70, with 60 members not voting. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
1428 (1869).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1035 (1869) (Sen. Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1035 (1869) (Rep. Bingham); seeWilliam Gillette, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLrMcs
AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 59,69 (1965) (discussing Senator Wilson's plan
to abolish discrimination or qualification for voting or holding of office based on race).
44. SeeMALTZ, supra note 3, at 157 (highlighting determination of Republican part of 39th
Congress to not come across to voters as party of black suffrage).
45. Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1995).
46. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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it extends to white citizens 7 The central question, therefore, is
whether the right to work on federally funded highway projects
should be considered a civil right, as the Reconstruction Republicans
would have defined it. Professor John Harrison of the University of
Virginia has argued it is not such a civil right."
If we regard services provided by general taxation as privileges of
citizens, we must then ask whether eligibility to be among those
who provide the services also constitutes a privilege. Although
answering this question is not easy, my thought is that the
taxpayer's money purchases the service, not the opportunity for
employment.49
Harrison, however, has the courage of his originalist convictions: he
concludes that if the right to work on highways is not a protected
privilege or immunity or civil right, then government is free to
discriminate against black citizens as well as in favor of them when
distributing the benefit.5" This is an outcome that no conservative
Justice would be willing to countenance.
If the principle of limited absolute equality is hard to apply in a
coherent way, are there other principles that might be extracted from
the Reconstruction Amendments and translated more successfully?
One possibility, suggested by Justice Thomas in his Adarand concur-
rence, is the prohibition on stigmatizing caste legislation. According
to Justice Thomas,
there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination... So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches
many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps,
minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing
indulgence .... In my mind, government-sponsored racial
discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice."1
47. See MALTz, supra note 3, at 4. Maltz argues:
Republicans were committed to the idea that all men were equally entitled to a limited
set of natural rights. Blacks were entitled to these rights not because racial discrimina-
tion was wrong; instead their claim was based on ... a theory of "limited absolute
liability"-that all men, whatever their condition or attributes were entitled to a certain
minimum level of rights.
I.
48. SeeJohn Harrison, Reronstructing the Privikges or Immunities Clausew, 101 YALE LJ. 1385,
1387 (1992) (arguing that Privileges or Immunities Clause is equality-based protection).
49. Id. at 1463-64.
50. I/. at 1391.
51. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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At first, this proposition seems implausible. Surely Thomas does
not mean to say that there are no moral or constitutional differences
between the malicious discrimination that led to slavery and the
benign discrimination that can lead, say, to an appointment to the
Supreme Court But, on reflection, Thomas' point seems provocative.
It is possible to argue that, regardless of its motivation, affirmative
action can stigmatize and degrade minorities just as slavery did,
because racial classifications of any kind promote racial castes.
Perhaps not all affirmative action is stigmatizing; but anything short
of an absolute ban would not adequately distinguish between racial
classifications that produce stigma and those that do not. Because so
much is stigmatizing, all must be banned.
There is no doubt that caste was a recurring theme in the debates
over the Civil War Amendments, especially in the speeches of Charles
Sumner.-2  Sumner proposed a joint resolution, which Congress
declined to pass, declaring that "there shall be no Oligarchy,
Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly invested with peculiar privileges and
powers"; but all persons shall be equal before the law, whether in the
court room or at the ballot box.3 When Senator Joshua Hill, a
Georgia Republican, insisted during debates over the Civil Rights Bill
of 1871"4 that separate accommodations were acceptable as long as
they were equal," Sumner insisted that separate accommodations
were inherently unequal. Sumner stated that "[t]he Senator does not
seem to see that any rule excluding a man on account of his color is
an indignity, an insult, and a wrong; and he makes himself on this
floor the representative of indignity, of insult, and of wrong to the
colored race."56 Focussing on the social meaning of segregation,
Sumner anticipated Chief Justice Earl Warren's argument in Brown
that segregation was likely to affect black students differently than
whites. Sumner argued: "Separation implies one thing for a white
person and another thing for a colored person; but equality is where
all have the same alike."57
The problem with Justice Thomas' (implicit) emphasis on the
stigma of caste is that the social meaning of affirmative action is
52. See Garrett Epps, Of Constitutional Seances and Color-Bind Ghosts, 72 N.C. L. REv. 401,420
(1994) (describing Charles Sumner's experience as plaintiff attorney for black student who
challenged requirements of attending segregated school and Sumner's role two decades later
in leading radical Republican forces in Reconstruction Congress).
53. 1d. (explaining that although Sumner's Resolution failed, his efforts left wording of
Fourteenth Amendment as race-neutral as original Constitution).
54. H.R. 380, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1871).
55. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 237-49 (1871).
56. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
57. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
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highly contested in contemporary politics. Some beneficiaries of
affirmative action may feel stigmatized, but others do not; and when
the social meaning of a political practice is contested, rather than
settled, principles of interpretive humility and judicial restraint
suggest that courts should remain agnostic about political judgments
made within the terms of contested discourse; and should accord
legislation on the subject greater deference rather than less."8 In
other words, Justice Thomas may or may not be correct, as a policy
matter, that the most efficient way of avoiding stigma is to ban
affirmative action in all circumstances; but it is odd for a self-styled
strict constructionist to impose this contested social judgment on the
political branches, rather than letting the political debate take its
course.
The act of historical translation is never easy; but the evidence
suggests that if the conservative Justices had made an honest attempt
to respect the intentions of the Reconstruction Republicans in the
race cases of 1995, they would have voted for judicial restraint rather
than judicial activism. Instead of declaring that the Constitution is
color-blind in all circumstances, they would have concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment neither imposes limits on race-conscious
districting nor does it, in all circumstances at least, forbid set-asides
for minority contractors. In his notorious opinion striking down the
Public Accommodations Act of 1875," Justice Bradley declared:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benefi-
cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation
when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the
special favorite of the laws.'
If the historic moment has arrived at last, the wrong heralds have
trumpeted its arrival. Once again, unelected judges have usurped a
political and moral decision that belongs to the Congress of the
United States. As Justice Scalia argued in the last abortion case, the
courts "should get out of this area, where they have no right to be,
and where they do neither themselves nor the country any good by
remaining.""1
58. See Lawrence Lessig, Undetanding Changed Readings: Fuelity and Theoty, 47 STAN. L. REV.
395, 439 (1995) (addressingjudicial role in changing interpretive contexts).
59. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
60. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 31 (1883).
61. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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